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THE LAW OF OBSCENITY AND MILITARY PRACTICE*
BY CAPTAIN HARVEY L. ZUCKMAN**
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, problems surrounding the law of obscenity
have become increasingly important and this development has
resulted in a corresponding awareness of these problems by the
courts, both state and federal. This awareness is now being ex-
tended into the military legal field. Two recent decisions, one by
the United States Court of Military AppealsI and the other by
an Army board of review,2 have focused attention on the military's
handling of obscenity problems under the Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice.3 These recent decisions encompass issues occurring
in civilian practice as well as issues peculiar to the military.
Before any analysis of these and related decisions can be under-
taken, however, it would be well to investigate the legal and
practical tests for determining obscenity in order to avoid the
error committed by one international convention. In the 1930's
this convention met in Geneva to discuss the common problem of
controlling the publication and dissemination of obscenity. Even
after prolonged and heated debate the convention was unable to
agree on a working definition of obscenity. But, as one noted
author put it,' after concluding that they didn't know what they
were talking about, the convention members settled down to dis-
cuss the subject.
II. WHAT IS OBSCENITY?
The question posed by the title of this section had long per-
plexed American courts as well as the aforementioned interna-
* The opinions and conclusions presented herein are those of the author
and do not necessarily represent the views of The Judge Advocate General's
School or any other governmental agency. None of the factual material herein
relating to trials by court-martial has been drawn from privileged documents.
** JAGC, USAR; Government Appellate Division, Office of the Judge
Advocate General, U. S. Army, 1960-1963; LL.B., 1959, New York University
Law School; Member of the California Bar and Bar of the U. S. Court of
Military Appeals.
1 United States v. Holt, 12 USCMA 471, 31 CMR 57 (1961).
,2CM 405791, Ford, 31 CMR 353 (1961), pet. denied, 31 CMR 314 (1962).
3 Act of May 5, 1950, § 1, ch. 169, 64 Stat. 108 (effective May 31, 1951).
Reenacted in 1956 as 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940. Act of Aug. 10, 1956, § 1, ch. 1041,
70A Stat. 1, 36-79 (effective Jan. 1, 1957) (hereinafter referred to as the
UCMJ or the Code and cited as UCMJ, art. __)
4 Huxley, Vulgarity in Literature (1930).
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tional convention when the case of United States v. Roth5 was
presented to the United States Supreme Court. Roth was a lead-
ing publisher and seller of erotic literature and other materials
who had made the mistake of sending certain of his material
through the mail. He was convicted in the Southern District of
New York for violating the federal mail obscenity statute 6 and
his conviction had been affirmed by the United States Court of
Appeals.7 Because the delicate and far-reaching constitutional
question of whether obscene expression is protected by the First
Amendment was involved in the case, the Supreme Court granted
review. The Court held that obscenity is not expression pro-
tected by the First Amendment and affirmed Roth's conviction.
Then, to insure that protectible expression was not mistaken for
that which was not, the Court attempted to define precisely what
obscenity was. In so doing the Court substantially adopted the
American Law Institute's view that "a thing is obscene if, con-
sidered as a whole, its predominant appeal is to prurient interest. '",
The rationale for the Court's holding that obscenity was not pro-
tected expression under the First Amendment was that obscenity
did not have "the slightest redeeming social importance." Thus,
in effect, the Court said that material may only be condemned as
obscene which has for its chief purpose the appeal to man's baser
instincts since such appeals have no redeeming social importance.
The narrowness of this standard is illustrated in part by the
possibility that some material may be so vile or repulsive as not
to appeal to the prurient interest of the average person in the
community and therefore be within the ambit of constitutional
protection.9
Thus, unless the Supreme Court chooses to broaden its test for
determining obscenity, and there appears to be no disposition
5354 U.S. 476 (1957).
618 U.S.C. § 1461 (1958).
7237 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1956).
8 Model Penal Code § 207.10 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957). The Court in turn
relied upon Webster's Dictionary to define "prurient interest" as "itching;
longing; uneasy with desire or longing; of persons, having itching, morbid,
or lascivious longings; of desire, curiosity or propensity, lewd." Webster,
New International Dictionary 1996 (2d ed. unabr. 1949).
9 That Henry Miller's Tropic of Cancer represents such material has been
suggested. Clayton, "Maryland 'Tropic' Ruling Faces Test," The Washington
Post, Dec. 25, 1961, § B, p. 16, cols. 1-3. Mr. Clayton, the Washington Post
legal writer, reported that Justice Department lawyers discovered that many
people found Miller's writings, which also include Tropic of Capricorn and
Quiet Days at Clichy, disgusting and shocking but not sexually exciting. For
this and other reasons "there was remarkable agreement that the Government
could not win if it charged that Miller's work is obscene." Shortly after this
conclusion was reached the Post Office and Customs Bureau bans on Tropic
of Cancer were lifted.
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on the part of the Court to do so at this time,' 0 obscenity prosecu-
tions, both military 11 and civilian should be limited to the con-
demnation of the publication or the dissemination of pornog-
raphy,' 2 i.e., material designed to arouse and excite the immature,
base and unnatural sexual instincts of the recipients.'3 More
specifically, pornography is material "which is designed to act
upon the reader as an erotic psychological stimulant" or "aphro-
disiac." 14 Definitions in this area are woefully inadequate to
convey precise meanings because words are used to explain other
words or concepts that have little or no concreteness. It is enough
to say, however, that whether obscenity is a broader concept than
pornography or is synonymous with it, prosecutions should be
limited to the publication and dissemination of materials obvi-
ously produced to exploit the sexual nature of men and women.' 5
10 If anything, the trend of thinking on the Court would seem to be in the
direction of narrowing the test for obscenity. At least two justices would
tighten the standard for condemning obscenity by requiring that the con-
demned material be both appealing to prurient interest and patently offensive
to the sensibilities. Manual Enterprises v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962) (opinion
by Harlan, J., concurred in by Stewart, J.).
11 It is settled that individuals in the armed services are entitled to the
constitutional protections of the Bill of' Rights except those which are
expressly or by necessary implication inapplicable to the defense establish-
ment. United States v. Jacoby, 11 USCMA 428, 29 CMR 244 (1960); Burns
v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953). Therefore, trial counsel are apparently
bound by the First Amendment rulings of the Supreme Court and in pre-
paring to prosecute "obscenity" cases would be well-advised to scrutinize the
material in question closely, even to the point of submitting it officially to
other individuals for their reactions before proceeding to trial.
12 In People v. Richmond County News, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 578, 175 N.E.2d 681,
216 N.Y.S.2d 369 (1961), a majority of the New York Court of Appeals, in
two separate opinions, decided that in conformity with the Supreme Court's
decision in Roth, the prohibitions of New York's criminal obscenity statute
must be limited to "hard-core pornography." See Lockhart & McClure,
Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 Minn.
L. Rev. 5, 60 (1960). But see Monfred v. State, 266 Md. 312, 173 A.2d 173
(1961) (majority and dissenting opinion). While Justice Harlan's opinion
in Manual Enterprises v. Day, supra note 10, left open the question whether
anything other than "hard-core pornography" may be condemned constitu-
tionally, it is submitted that the only material meeting the two-fold test for
obscenity laid down in the opinion is "hard-core pornography."
13 The Kronhausens, Pornography and the Law 18, 178-244 (1959) ; Lock-
hart & McClure, supra note 12, at 62-66.
14 The Kronhausens, op. cit. supra note 13, at 178.
15 A valuable study providing an interesting guide for the determination
of material constructed to exploit the prurient interest of individuals is that
conducted by Drs. Eberhard and Phyllis Kronhausen and reported in their
book, Pornography and the Law. They isolate the main characteristic of
pornography as the "buildup of erotic excitement." Op. cit. supra note 13,
at 178. It is interesting to note that the Government appended this work to
its appellate pleading before the Army board of review in CM 405791, Ford,
supra note 2, as an aid to the board in determining whether Helen and Desire
by Frances Lengel was obscene.
AGO 8062B 45
MILITARY LAW REVIEW
In summary, then, when we talk about obscenity we do not refer
to erotic material in its entirety 16 but rather to that material
which deliberately exploits sex in such a way as to arouse and
excite the sex instincts and drives of persons who are exposed to
the material.
III. COMMON OBSCENITY QUESTIONS IN
CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PRACTICE
The two recent Army obscenity cases raise many questions
which also confront the civilian bench and bar. Discussion of
these common questions will be followed by a separate discussion
of obscenity problems particularly relevant to military practice.
The first significant obscenity case to reach the United States
Court of Military Appeals is that of United States v. Holt 17 in
which the accused, a thirty-two year old sergeant, wrote a series
of "love letters" to a young under-age girl with whom he was
having a sexual affair. The girl saved the letters which were
subsequently discovered by her mother. The sergeant was charged
with carnal knowledge in violation of Article 120 and three speci-
fications of mailing obscene letters in violation of Article 134.18
He-pleaded guilty to ll charges and specifications, but as a matter
in aggravation the trial counsel introduced the sergeant's letters
after the findings. On appeal to an Army board of review, the ac-
cused contended that his plea of guilty to the mail offenses was
improvidently entered since the letters were not obscene. Without
16 As Justice Brennan said in his opinion for the Court in the Roth case,
... [S]ex and obscenity are not synonymous. Obscene material is material
which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest. The
portrayal of sex, e.g., in art, literature and scientific works, is not itself
sufficient reason to deny material the constitutional protection of freedom of
speech and press." 354 U.S. at 487.
17 12 USCMA 471, 31 CMR 57 (1961).
18 While the obscenity specifications gave no indication under which clause
of Article 134 they were laid, appellate counsel for both the defendant and
the Government assumed that the federal mail obscenity statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1461 (1958), had been incorporated in the prosecution under the "crimes
and offenses not capital" clause of the general article. 12 USCMA at 472 n.
1, 31 CMR at 58 n. 1. For a thorough discussion of the history and legal
problems surrounding the federal mail obscenity statute, see Paul & Schwartz,
Federal Censorship: Obscenity in the Mail (1961); Paul, The Post Ofice and
Non-Mailability of Obscenity: An Historical Note, 8 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 44
(1961); Paul & Schwartz, Obscenity in the Mails: A Comment on Some
Problems of Federal Censorship, 106 U. Pa. L. Rev. 214 (1957); Lockhart &
McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Standards,
45 Minn. L. Rev. 5 (1960); Zuckman, Obscenity in the Mails, 33 So. Cal. L.
Rev. 171 (1960).
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ruling on the precise question presented, the board, one member
dissenting, held the sergeant's plea inconsistent with his testimony
on sentence that he "intended the letters only as 'love letters."' The
Judge Advocate General then certified to the Court of Military
Appeals the broad question whether the board of review was
"correct in holding that the plea of guilty... was improvident." As
a result of The Judge Advocate General's action several important
questions of obscenity law confronted the Court.
The first of these questions was whether a letter writer's sub-
jective intent has any relevance to a prosecution for sending
obscene matter through the mail. If the answer was in the affirma-
tive, the sergeant's protestations that the letters were intended
by him as nothing more than letters of affection to a loved one
would clearly be inconsistent with his plea of guilty. Several
years earlier in the landmark case of United States v. Dennett 19
the United States Court of Appeals was faced with a similar prob-
lem. In that case the defendant, a woman of unimpeachable charac-
ter, had mailed copies of a pamphlet which she had written for
the purpose of instructing her two sons on "The Sex Side of Life."
While the court reversed the woman's conviction for violating
the federal mail obscenity statute on the ground that the pamphlet
was not obscene, Judge Augustus Hand, sp'aking for the court,
clearly rejected the woman's defense of good motives as irrele-
vant.20 In effect, the case ruled that violation of the mail obscenity
statute required only general intent.21 It would be enough to
ground a conviction under the statute for the Government to show
that the defendant mailed legally obscene matter knowing simply
the contents of that matter.2 2 T4i "whys" and "wherefores" of
the mailing were of no consequence.
19 39 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1930).
20 "It is doubtless true that the personal motive of the defendant in
distributing her pamphlet could have no bearing on the question whether she
violated the law. Her own belief that a really obscene pamphlet would pay
the price for its obscenity by means of intrinsic merits would leave her much
as ever under the ban of the statute." 39 F.2d at 568. Accord, Verner v.
United States, 183 F.2d 184 (9th Cir. 1950). See Grove Press, Inc. v.
Christenberry, 175 F.Supp. 488, 501-02 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff'd, 276 F.2d 433
(2d Cir. 1960).
21 See also Magon v. United States, 248 Fed. 201 (9th Cir. 1918), cert.
denied, 249 U.S. 618 (1919); Knowles v. United States, 170 Fed. 409 (8th
Cir. 1909).
22 But, of course, there would be no need for the Government to show that
the accused knew or even suspected that the matter was obscene. Rosen v.
United States, 161 U.S. 29 (1896); Magon v. United States, supra note 21;
see Burton v. United States, 142 Fed. 57 (8th Cir. 1906).
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In arguing to the Court of Military Appeals that Sergeant
Holt's testimony was not legally inconsistent, the Government
urged the Court to follow federal precedent in order to assure de-
velopment of obscenity law under Article 134 of the Uniform
Code consistent with settled federal law. This the Court did.
In stating that "purity of motive is no defense to impurity of
writing," the tribunal clearly held that a writer's subjective intent
in writing and mailing material later adjudged to be obscene is
immaterial. Thus, testimony by an accused as to his subjective in-
tent or motive in mailifig a letter cannot be legally inconsistent
with his guilty plea.
Because of the broad nature of the certified question, the Court
was also presented with the issue originally raised by the accused
before the board of review, namely, whether the letters were
actually obscene. The Court refused to meet this issue head-on
because it was of the belief that the question of obscenity was for
the triers of fact, with review limited to the question of the legal
sufficiency of the findings. 23 The Court said that had the accused
not pleaded guilty and had the court-martial returned findings
of guilty on the merits, it would be compelled to hold the evidence
(the letters) sufficient to support the conviction. This approach
would involve only the same scope of appellate review accorded
all criminal prosecutions by the Court.
It is submitted that the Court of Military Appeals may be tak-
ing too restricted a view of its powers of review in obscenity cases.
If the determination of what is and what is not obscene is purely
an ordinary factual question, then the Court was, of course,
correct in refusing to examine the letters for any purpose other
than to uphold the legal sufficiency of the court-martial's deter-
mination that the letters were obscene. But there is much respect-
able authority for the proposition that the determination of what
is and what is not obscenity is something more than an ordinary
factual matter to be left in the exclusive control of the finders
of fact.24 Under this proposition, even the fact that the accused
pleads guilty in an obscenity prosecution would not alter the
appellate court's duty to go beyond the question of legal suf-
ficiency.
23See United States v. Wheatley, 10 USCMA 539, 28 CMR 105 (1959),
affirming CM 401092, Wheatley, 28 CMR 28 CMR 461 (semble).
24 See Manual Enterprises v. Day, supra note 10; Capitol Enterprises, Inc.
v. City of Chicago, 260 F.2d 670 (7th Cir. 1958) ; People v. Richmond County
News, Inc., supra note 12; Monfred v. State, 226 Md. 312, 173 A.2d 173 (1961)
(dissenting opinion by Hammond, J.); Commonwealth v. Moniz, 338 Mass.
442, 155 N.E. 2d 762 (1959); Lockhart & McClure, supra note 18, at 114-120.
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The theory behind this somewhat unique proposition is that the
question of what may be suppressed as obscene through criminal
prosecution is a constitutional matter which appellate courts have
a solemn duty to consider.25 This constitutional consideration
amounts to a de novo finding on the question of whether the
material alleged to be obscene by the prosecution and found to be
obscene by the triers of fact is obscene. Such a determination goes
beyond the determination whether a reasonable trier of fact
could find the material in issue obscene and represents justifiable
"second-guessing" by the appellate courts.
The best judicial exposition of the theory to date may be found
in Judge Fuld's opinion in People v. Richmond County News, Inc.26
In that case the defendant corporation had been found guilty in
the trial court of distributing an obscene magazine in violation of
section 1141 of the New York Penal Code, the state's criminal
obscenity statute. The conviction was reversed by the state's
intermediate appellate court on the ground that the proof failed
to establish the defendant's knowledge of the magazine's obscene
character.27 The state appealed, and by a narrow margin of four
to three, the New York Court of Appeals held that the magazine
in question was not obscene, regardless of the finding below. Judge
Fuld minced no words in declaring the appellate court's power to
make this determination:
The courts beiow have characterized the magazine as "obscene," but
whether that finding is justified requires us . . . to make an independent
constitutional appraisal of the magazine. This court, as the State's
highest tribunal, no less than the United States Supreme Court, cannot
escape its responsibility in this area "by saying that the trier of the facts,
be it a jury or a judge, has labeled the questioned matter as 'obscene,' for,
if 'obscenity' is to be suppressed, the question whether a particular work
is of that character involves not really an issue of fact but a question of
constitutional judgment of th? most sensitive and delicate kind." Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 497-498 . . . [Harlan, J., concurring] .... t-
If a state appellate court can be so certain that the question
of what is and what is not obscene involves constitutional judg-
25 See Manual Enterprises v. Day, rupra note 10; Roth v. United
States, supra note 5, at 497-498 (concurring opinion); People v. Richmond
County News, Inc., supra note 12; Lockhart & McClure, supra note 18, at
114-120.
269 N.Y.2d 578, 175 N.E.2d 681, 216 N.Y.S.2d 369 (1961). While Judge
Fuld's opinion was concurred in by only one other judge, two more judges
of the seven-man New York Court of Appeals agreed in a separate opinion
that the hghest appellate court of the state of New York had the power to
make an independent judgment as to what was and what was not obscene.
27 See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
28 9 N.Y.2d at 580, 175 N.E.2d at 681-82, 216 N.Y.S.2d at 370. See Com-
monwealth v. Moniz, supra note 24; Lockhart & McClure, supra note 18, at
114-120, for very nearly the identical judgment.
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ment which it must exercise independently of the lower courts, 29
then surely a federal court, 30 such as the Court of Military Appeals,
would be hardpressed to find substantial grounds for abdicating
this judgment to the triers of fact.31 This is particularly true in
light of the Court's recently pronounced intention to champion
the constitutional rights of military personnel against all en-
croachments. 32 Since it seems clear that before criminal prosecu-
tions for the publication, dissemination or communication of
obscenity will be sanctioned, the material in question must be
found to be of such character, i.e., obscene, as to be beyond the pale
of First Amendment protection, the Court may well have erred
in failing to make an independent appraisal of Sergeant Holt's
letters, despite his plea of guilty.
Perhaps the most significant question raised in Holt was the
standard to be utilized by triers of fact and, assuming they have
the power to make independent determinations, the appellate
courts, in finding obscenity. This question more than any other
has preoccupied the courts over the years. Until the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Roth, many American courts
applied the harsh and confining standard enunciated in Regina v.
Hicklin 33 that material could be adjudged obscene by the effect of
an isolated excerpt upon particularly susceptible persons. Rigid
application of this rule would undoubtedly result in forcing down
the level of American literature. At least one federal trial court
29 But see Monfred v. State, supra note 24.
30 Two federal appellate courts have now taken it upon themselvEs to make
independent judgments as to the (haracter of allegedly obscEne material.
See United States v. Keller, 259 F.2d 54 (3d Cir. 1958) ; Capitol Enterprises,
Inc. v. City of Chicago, supra note 24. While a majority of the United Stateb
Supreme Court have not ruled expressly on this question of independent
review by appellate tribunals, certain of the Court's pcr curiam decisions
suggest that such procedure is also followed by the Court itself. See Times
Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 355 U.S. 35 (1958); reversing 244 F.2d 432
(7th Cir. 1957); Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S. 372 (1958),
reversing 249 F.2d 114 (D.C. Cir. 1957); One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371
(1958), reversing 241 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1957).
31 The Court's statutory jurisdiction limiting review to the law should prove
no bar since th's judgment involves no more than the application of constitu-
tional legal standards to the material in issue. The Court has already held
that it has the power to decide mixed questions of law and fact. See United
States v. Flagg, 11 USCMA 636, 29 CMR 452 (1960).
32 See United States v. Jacoby, 11 USCMA 428, 29 CMR 244 (1960), in
which the Court stated, in upholding the right of accused service personnel
to personal confrontation of witnesses as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment,
that ". . . [I~t is apparent that the protections in the Bill of Rights, except
those which are expressly or by necessary implication, inapplicable, are avail-
able to members of our armed forces." 11 USCMA at 430-31, 29 CMR at
246-47. See also Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 181 (1962).
33 [1868] 3 Q.B. 360.
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revolted against this existing standard in the early 1930's,3 4 but
it was not until the Roth case that a more liberal standard was
made the law of the land. The Supreme Court rejected the Hicklin
test as unconstitutional in that it condemned material which had
legitimate claim to protection under the First Amendment. In
its place the high court substituted the test that material was
obscene and beyond constitutional protection only if, when judged
as a whole, it appealed to the prurient interest of the average
person in the community.35 No longer could lawful criminal prose-
cutions be based on isolated passages of otherwise reputable
literary works.
36
Once the Supreme Court had spoken it might seem that the
Court of Military Appeals and all other federal and state courts
would have merely to apply this new obscenity standard in all
cases. But it must be remembered that Roth involved the mailing
of mass circulation publications to all sorts of persons throughout
the United States. Therefore, in Holt the Government questioned
whether the standard enunciated in Roth was the appropriate one
to be applied in the case of private handwritten letters mailed to
one specific individual. While arguing that the letters were obscene
under the Roth standard, the Government contended alternatively
that in personal letter cases, mail matter should be declared
obscene if it appealed merely to the recipient's prurient interest in
the case of one addressee and the prurient interest of the average
person in a limited audience if the mail matter is directed to a
specialized group.37 Essentially what the Government was con-
34 United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," 5 F.Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y.
1933), aff'd, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934).
35 Inasmuch as only two justices have spoken in favor of narrowing this
obscenity standard by adding the requirement of "patent offensiveness," see
note 10 supra, it must be assumed that this standard remains unchanged as
the basic yardstick for measuring obscenity.
36 For the opinion that the Roth decision will have a beneficial influence on
American letters, see Lewis, "Power to Censor Is Still Unclear," New York
Times, Dec. 20, 1959, § 4, col. 5, p. 8E.
37 Brief for the United States, p. 13, United States v. Holt, 12 USCMA
471, 31 CMR 57 (1961). In support of its position the Government relied
principally on the case of United States v. 31 Photographs, 156 F.Supp. 350
(S.D.N.Y. 1957). In that case the Government sought to confiscate
certain materials which the Institute for Sex Research, Inc. (the "Kinsey
Institute") sought to import into the United States. In releasing the matt rial
to the Institute, Judge Palmieri held that a proper determination of obscenity
requ'red looking to the impact of the questioned material upon those whom
it is likely to reach. Since those whom the foreign pornography was likely
to reach were all objective scientists devoted to the serious study of sex in
all of its manifestations, the judge could not hold the material obscene as to
the receiving group involved. The Government in Holt also relied upon the
more recent case of Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 289 F.2d 455 (D.C. Cir.
1961), which involved administrative action by the post office barring certain
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tending for was a variable standard of obscenity as opposed to
the rigid constant standard of Roth.38 This approach takes into
consideration the actual audience to whom allegedly obscene
material is communicated and would allow material to be con-
demned as obscene if it appealed to the prurient interest of those
to whom it is directed, even though it had no such appeal to the
average person in the community.3 9 This standard can be a double-
edged sword as far as the Government is concerned since it is
possible for material to be considered obscene under the constant
standard of Roth and yet not be obscene in relation to the audience
or receiving group to which the material is directed. 40 The Govern-
ment subsequently was made fully cognizant of this fact in the
Ford case.41 In Holt the Court felt it unnecessary to decide what
standard would be applicable to private personal letters because
the letters there could be found to be obscene, regardless of the
standard utilized. But the Court, while leaving the question open,
did note that the Government had "conceded" that the Roth
standard was inapplicable.
42
allegedly homosexual periodicals from the mail. The United States Court of
App als found that the publications were such that the "average man in the
community" would be an atypical reader, not likely to be affected by the
publications, and, therefore, the impact of the publications had to be tested
by the average member of the audience to which the materials were directed,
i.e., the average homosexual. This decision was reversed by the Supreme
Court, 370 U.S. 478 (1962), but the issue of variable obscenity was never
reached by the Supreme Court nor was any law fixed by the decision. Two of
the justices, Harlan and Stewart, decided that the Post Office Department
and the Court of Appeals had relied on an erroneous standard for determining
obscenity, i.e., the Roth standard alone, and proceeded to find the magazines
in question not obscene under the standard set forth in their opinion. Justices
Brennan, Warren and Douglas held only that Congress had given the Post
Office Department no authority to withhold allegedly obscene material from
the mails by administrative action and hence, reversal of the ban was required.
Justice Black concurred solely in the result. The only other Justice to take
part in th- decision was Justice Clark who dissented, saying, "While those in
the majority, like ancient Gaul, are split into three parts, the ultimate holding
of the Court today ... requires the United States Post Office to be the world's
largest disseminator of smut and Grand Informer of the names and places
where obscene material may be obtained." 370 U.S. at 519.
38 The leading proponents of the variable obscenity standard are Professors
William B. Lockhart and Robert C. McClure of the University of Minnesota
Law School. They make a persuasive argument for this more flexible ap-
proach to obscenity in their leading article Censorship of Obscenity: The
Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 5, 77-88 (1960).
39 See Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, supra note 37.
40 See United States v. 31 Photographs, supra note 37.
41 CM 405791, Ford, 31 CMR 353 (1961), pet. denied, 31 CMR 314 (1962).
42 12 USCMA at 472, n. 2, 31 CMR at 58, n. 2. The Court's understanding
that the Government had conceded this point is apparently erroneous for the
Government argued alternatively in its brief that even were the variable
standard not applicable the appellant's letters should still be condemned as
obscene under the Roth standard. Brief for the United States, p. 14.
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Grasping firmly to the Government's theory in Holt, the appel-
lant Ford insisted that his letters to a pornography peddler
describing in lurid detail the kinds of pornographic photographs
he desired could not be considered obscene. The peddler was
simply in the business of filling such orders and would be left un-
affected by the letters.43 The Government's embarrassment at find-
ing its own theory being used against it points up the problem of
attempting to use one obscenity standard to cover all or even a
large number of cases. Obscenity cases have too many unique
facets to be comfortably categorized and ruled by stare decisis.
What standard should be used to govern private personal mail-
ings is still open to the inventiveness of counsel and court,
whether military or civilian.
44
If, however, one uniform standard is to be chosen by the courts,
then it is submitted it should be the variable standard with its
emphasis on the audience to whom questioned material is directed.
This standard has the advantage of flexibility which the fixed
stapdard of Roth does not possess. Under the variable standard
the mailing of hard-core pornography to an organization like the
Kinsey Institute would not be a violation of law because intended
for scientists whose primary interest in the material would be
serious. 45 Under the unbending standard of Roth the sender of
this same material, though his motives be pure, would have to be
held in violation of federal law since the material would appeal to
the prurient interest of the average person in the community
even though not intended for his eyes. On the other hand, the
variable standard can be employed to strike at the vile profiteers
whose market is the youth of the country or other groups which
are particularly susceptible to erotic excitement. Their mailings,
frankly appealing to adolescent or aberrant curiosity, would be
condemned under the variable standard even though the mailings
are adjudged as failing to arouse the prurient interest of the
average person in the community. So long as the prurient interest
of the average child or deviant of the group to which the material
is directed is appealed to, the sender would be subject to the
sanctions of the law.
43 Brief for Appellant, p. 16, CM 405791, Ford, supra note 41. The Govern-
ment answered this contention by suggesting that smut peddlers are sick
individuals themselves, particularly susceptible to the excitation of "dirty"
letters. Brief for the United States, p. 6. In this connection, see Caprio &
Brenner, Sexual Behavior: Psycholegal Aspects 260-61 (1961).
44 One federal court, however, in a decision subsequent to Holt, has held
that the constant standard of Roth applies to private personal letters as well
as to mass circulation distributions. United States v. Ackerman, 293 F.2d 449
(9th Cir. 1961).
45 Cf. United States v. 31 Photographs, supra note 37.
AGO 8062B 53
MILITARY LAW REVIEW
Thus, the flexibility of the variable standard of obscenity
provides a basis for judging the true character of the conduct of
the sender by looking at the nature of the audience to whom the
material is directed. And certainly the law should distinguish
between the sender who directs material through the mail for
scientific or educational purposes and the sender who seeks only to
line his pockets by corrupting a segment of the normal population
or preying upon the deviations of abnormal groups within society.
The final question raised in Holt was whether the federal mail
obscenity statute 46 covers the obscene private letters of persons
having a close personal relationship. Appellate defense counsel
contended that the fact that Sergeant Holt and his girl friend
were lovers exempted them from the prohibitions of the statute.
The Court had little trouble disposing of this contention since the
legislative history of the present statute clearly indicated the act's
all-inclusive nature.
47
In Ford the most important question of obscenity law raised
was that involving scienter or guilty knowledge. The accused of-
ficer was a collector of pornography who, in addition to mailing
several obscene letters to a pornography merchant, also exhibited
and disseminated certain obscene material to friends. In one in-
stance the accused loaned a bartender in a bar frequented by him
a copy of the book Helen and Desire.48 The evidence of record did
not establish that the accused had any knowledge of the contents
of the book which he loaned to the bartender. During an out-of-
court hearing the law officer sua sponte brought up the question
of scienter and concluded that lack of knowledge of the contents
of the book was not an element of the Article 133 offense of con-
duct unbecoming an officer and gentleman but that such lack of
knowledge could be raised by the accused as a complete defense
under the label off "mistake of fact." 49 The law officer also ruled
46 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1958).
47 See 1955 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2210; Thomas v. United States,
262 F.2d 844 (6th Cir. 1959). See also United States v. Musgrave, 160 Fed.
700, 706 (E.D. Ark. 1908) (construing predecessor statute, Rev. Stat. § 3893
(1875)); United States v. Stickrath, 242 Fed. 151 (S.D. Ohio 1917). There
seems little doubt but that a husband would be criminally liable under the
statute for mailing an obscene "love letter" to his own wife. However, the
wisdom of prosecuting such cases seems highly qurstionaM".
48 Published by the Olympia Press of Paris, which Time Magazine has
described as "the world's most notorious publisher of ingl.sn language
pornography." Time, "Shy Pornographer," Nov. 3, 1961, p. 88.
49 The instruction on scienter was as follows: ". . . [Kinowledge by the
accused that the material, which was in fact lewd and lascivious, was con-
tained in or appeared upon the item exhibited or loaned to another, is not an
essential element of the offense . .. ; however, the facts and circumstances,
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that the only knowledge the accused had to possess was that of the
actual contents of the book in question. The accused's belief
as to the nature and quality of the material was irrelevant. 0
On appeal to the Army board of review the accused officer con-
tended that the law officer erred in instructing the court-martial
that knowledge was not an element of the offense. Prejudice would
arise from shifting the burden of coming forward with the
evidence from the Government to the accused. The board agreed
with the accused and held that scienter was an element of the
offense. However, the board refused to reverse the finding of
guilty of conduct unbecoming an officer. In construing the law
officer's instruction the board found that the law officer had actually
informed the court-martial that knowledge was an element of
the Government's case; hence the accused had not been prejudiced.
Whatever the relative merits of the board's construction, the
decision is significant because it clearly holds that guilty knowl-
edge is an element of the offense of conduct unbecoming an of-
ficer when the conduct condemned is the dissemination of
obscenity.51 It would also seem that the decision is authority for
the proposition that the degree of sci!nter required is only that
of knowledge of the contents of the allegedly obscene material.
The board of review at least talked in those terms in its opinion.
In the author's opinion the decision in Ford is sound and should
be adopted by the Court of Military Appeals in the event that tri-
bunal is faced with the issue of scienter. First, from a procedural
as shown by the evidence, indicate the possibility from which the court might
generate a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused might have made a
mistake of fact. If the court, in considering the evidence, does not exclude
beyond a reasonable doubt the possibility on the circumstantial evidence in
this case that the accused did not know of the contents of the document or
photograph at the time it was shown or released by him to another, ...
then that the fact will relieve the accused of all responsibility, . . . and he
must be acquitted. With respect to this evidence, the court is advised that
if the accused was laboring under such a mistake, and if his mistake was
honest and reasonable, he cannot be found guilty; however, such mistake
must be both honest and reasonable in order to justify an acquittal .... (I]f
the accused was not aware that he was presenting the matter ... to another
person, then he cannot, if that belief was honest and reasonable,. .. be found
guilty of this offense, and that is so even though his knowledge is not a fact
that must be proved by the prosecution as an essential element .... " CM
405791, Ford, supra note 41, at 355.
50 For support on this ruling the law officer might turn by way of analogy
to the federal mail obscenity statute which requires only knowledge of the
contents of the mail matter alleged to be obscene. See note 22 supra.
51 Several service boards of review have also taken this position on scienter
in cases involving the striking of superior commissioned or non-commissioned
officers. CGCMS 21251, Gill, 30 CMR 740 (1961); ACM 16234, Castro, 28
CMR 760 (1959); CM 360874, Murphy, 9 CMR 473 (1953); CM 359569,
Moffet, 9 CMR 343 (1953).
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standpoint it seems desirable to require the Government to plead
and prove guilty knowledge and to allow the accused to contest
this element by pleading not guilty and by coming forth with evi-
dence of his lack of knowledge of the material. This approach,
inherent in Ford, is less complicated than one requiring the ac-
cused to plead and prove an affirmative defense of lack of knowl-
edge, with the Government then being required to rebut the af-
firmative defense. This raising of the question of scienter by way
of affirmative defense entails several shifting of the burden of
coming forward with the evidence, and it would be well to avoid
this. The Ford approach has the added virtue of being consonant
with the existing federal procedure in mail obscenity prosecu-
tions.5 2
From a substantive standpoint the Ford holding that scienter is
an element of the Government's case is also sound. It avoids a
possible constitutional infirmity present in the affirmative defense
approach to raising the issue of scienter. Certainly, a compelling
argument can be made that when a democratic sovereign curtails
freedom to publish and disseminate written and pictorial matter
by instituting criminal prosecutions, the sovereign should be the
party burdened with pleading and coming forward, in the first
instance, with evidence of scienter. To place this burden on the
accused might have a decisive effect on the outcome of the trial.
Where there is a lack of evidence on a given issue, the party hav-
ing the burden of coming forward with the evidence loses on that
issue. A procedural rule favoring the prosecution and making the
defense against obscenity prosecutions more difficult could in-
timidate publishers and disseminators of written and pictorial
material to curtail the publication and dissemination of some
material which may be within the protection of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. This possible indirect effect of a pro-
cedural rule of law might be enough to condemn the rule as in-
fringing on constitutional rights.
53
An important point to note with regard to the issue of scienter
is that very little law in this area is settled. Trial counsel pre-
paring to prosecute obscenity cases under Articles 133 and 134
would be well-advised, then, to introduce on their own initiative
as much circumstantial and direct evidence of guilty knowledge
as is reasonably available. Failure to consider the question of
scienter carefully could well result in settling the law at the
expense of the Government's case.
52 See test accompanying notes 68-79 infra.
53 Cf. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959) (the leading federal decision
holding for the requirement of scienter in obscenity prosecutions).
56 AGO 80G62
OBSCENITY AND MILITARY PRACTICE
IV. OBSCENITY PROBLEMS OF SPECIAL CONCERN
TO THE MILITARY
A. SUBSTANTIVE QUESTIONS
The standard for condemning material as obscene is whether the
material appeals to the prurient interest of the average person in
the contemporary community.5 4 A question relative to the Roth
standard which has particular relevance to the military is the defi-
nition of "community." Is the relevant community geographic
in nature or institutional? Or is the concept of "community" really
rather meaningless? If, in Roth, the Supreme Court was referring
to a grouping of people in a particular space, courts-martial would
have to take into consideration the location of the Army post
wherein the alleged obscenity offense occurred together with the
mores of the civilian and military communities in that locale. If,
on the other hand, the Supreme Court was speaking generally of
the present day over-all American cultural society, as Justices
Harlan and Stewart suggest in their opinion in Manual Enter-
prises v. Day,55 the location of the alleged offense would be im-
material. From the viewpoint of those interested in uniformity
throughout the military establishment, the less geographical in
nature the concept the more desirable it will be. Material which is
obscene at one Army installation should be obscene at any other
installation, whether that installation be located on the plains of
Kansas or at Governor's Island, New York.
Finally, a more practical but no less important question for
military justice is the conduct which may be condemned under
Articles 133 and 134 of the Uniform Code. There is no question
that the sending of obscene letters and other material through the
mail is violative of the Code.56 So is the making of obscene phone
calls to unconsenting women 57 and the exhibiting of obscene
54 United States v. Roth, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
55 370 U.S. 478 (1962). Two Justices, Harlan and Stewart, have already
stated their belief that the relevant community is national in scope. "There
must first be decided the relevant 'community' in terms of whose standards
of decency the issue must be judged. We think that the proper test under
this federal statute, reaching as it does to all parts of the United States whose
population reflects many different ethnic and cultural backgrounds, is a
national standard of decency." 370 U.S. at See also Lockhart & McClure,
Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 Minn.
L. Rev. 5, 113-14 (1960).
56 United States v. Holt, 12 USCMA 471, 31 CMR 57 (1961) ; CM 405791,
Ford, 31 CMR 353 (1961), pet. denied, 31 CMR 314 (1962).




motion pictures for profit in a government-owned building.68
While there are few reported military obscenity cases, and gen-
eralization can be hazardous, it would seem that any open and
notorious communication or dissemination of obscene language
or material would be conduct unbecoming an officer and gentle-
man, conduct to the discredit of the service, or conduct pre-
judicial to good order and discipline. But the trend of the military
cases is opposed to the idea that mere possession of obscene mat-
ter is violative of either Article 133 or 134 of the Uniform Code.5 9
And in the Ford case an Army board of review held that the
exhibition of obscene pictures by an officer to another while
in his own quarters during a social occasion did not constitute
conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman. It has been sug-
gested that to punish mere possession of obscenity would be a
violation of First Amendment guarantees. 60
Under present interpretations of the general articles only those
acts involving obscenity which have a decided tendency to degrade
or corrupt servicemen or civilians, bring discredit upon the serv-
ice, destroy discipline and respect for rank are condemned.
Certainly, the sale of salacious material or the exhibition of
salacious shows or films for a price is corrupting and degrading
to both seller and purchaser. Commercial transactions involving
obscene matter should not be tolerated. Nor should the notorious
exhibition of obscenity to those of lower military status by men
of greater status be tolerated. Such exhibition would cause, if
nothing else, contempt toward the exhibitors, which contempt
could be easily translated into disciplinary problems. Although
the possession of obscenity and the limited dissemination of such
material in social situations must be condemned in a moral sense,
58 CM 364954, Cowan, 12 CMR 374 (1953).
59 CM 400388, Schneider, 27 CMR 566 (1958); CM 405791, Ford, supra
note 56.
60 In State v. Mapp, 170 Ohio St. 427, 166 N.E.2d 387 (1960), four judges
of the seven-judge Ohio Supreme Court held an Ohio statute imposing
criminal penalties for the bare possession and control of obscene material to
be in contravention of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution. However, since the state constitution of Ohio prohibits
the state supreme court from striking down legislation unless at least six of
the seven justices concur in the decision, the Ohio high court was compelled
to affirm the conviction of Miss Mapp for doing nothing more than knowingly
safekeeping certain pornography belonging to a former boarder in her homo.
The court's majority opinion, in effect, invited the United States Supreme
Court to reverse the decision on appeal by Striking down the statute a
unconstitutional on its face. The Supreme Court did reverse the conviction
but on the ground that the evidence upon which the conviction was based
was secured by the Cleveland police in violation of the Fourth Amendment
and was therefore inadmissible, even in a state prosecution. Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961), overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
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such conduct is not, in and of itself, violative of Articles 133 and
134. The Army boards of review have made a distinction between
a soldier's military life and his private life in this area of the law.
B. PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS
The first important procedural question in obscenity prosecu-
tions under the Uniform Code is how alleged offenses are to be
pleaded. Most of the important issues are well handled in the
Simmons case.61 In that case the accused was found guilty of
communicating telephonically obscene language to a female under
a specification which detailed the language used and labeled this
language as obscene. 62 The accused contended that because the
words used were open to a possible innocent interpretation, and
"were not obscene per se," the specification did not state an of-
fense. In order to state an offense, according to the accused, the
Government had to further allege that the accused used the words
in an obscene manner and that they were so understood by the
female to whom they were addressed. In affirming the findings
of guilty, an Army board of review held that a specification which
made a bare allegation that an accused uttered obscene language
to a female would be legally sufficient. The board found support
for its holding in the modern practice of avoiding the pleading
of evidentiary facts.
The board's decision, based as it is on the modern practice of
notice pleading, is applicable to every type of obscenity offense.
Thus, in the case of mail offenses it would only be necessary in the
specifications to identify the objectionable letters by postmark
and to characterize the letters as obscene.6 3 The same is true of
obscene publications and motion pictures. All that is required is
that the material be identified by title, that the time and place of
the offense be alleged, and that the material be characterized as
obscene.64 Because of the rule that allegedly obscene matter must
61 CM 400786, Simmons, supra note 57.
62 See 27 CMR at 656 for the language of the specification.
63 Section 1461 of the Criminal Code of the United States talks in terms of
"lewd, lascivious, obscene," and if the federal mail obscenity statute is specifi-
cally incorporated in the pleading, it is advisable to characterize the mail
matter in this fashion. Otherwise, a characterization that the mail matter
Is "obscene" is sufficient since the words used in section 1461 are synonymous,
and use of more than one of them would be surplusage.
64 In the case of prosecutions under Article 134 it is unnecessary to allege
that the particular conduct was to the prejudice of good order and discipline
or that it was to the discredit of the service. United States v. Marker, 1
USCMA 393, 400, 3 CMR 127, 134 (1952) ; ACM 14661, French, 25 CMR 851
(1958), aff'd in part and rcv'd in part, 10 USCMA 171, 27 CMR 245 (1959).
But, of course, an instruction to the court-martial on this element is required.
United States v. Williams, 8 USCMA 325, 24 CMR 135 (1957); United States
v. Gittens, 8 USCMA 673, 05 CIR 177 (1958).
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be judged as a whole, it would be unwise in drafting specifications
to pick out particular written passages or visual scenes for in-
clusion in the pleadings. Specifications quoting such passages or
describing such scenes would be subject to attack on appeal on the
ground that improper standards had been utilized by the Gov-
ernment, and therefore the charges and specifications did not
allege offenses. In the case of untitled photographs or motion
pictures, however, a simple allegation that the film or photograph
is obscene would likely not withstand a motion to make more de-
finite and certain. In such case, the specification should contain
a general, over-all description of the material.
Another question with regard to pleading is under what clause
of Article 134 should obscenity offense be brought. The general
article has three clauses under which specifications may be laid:
(1) disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and
discipline in the armed forces; (2) conduct of a nature to bring
discredit upon the armed forces; and (3) federal crimes and
offenses not capital.65 Mail offenses may fall within any one or
more of these categories and can always be alleged under the third
clause of Article 134. But is it wise to specify that certain conduct
violates a particular enumerated federal statute? The answer,
from the prosecution's point of view, is decidedly not. The federal
statute may require a particular mode or element of proof that
would not be required by alleging the offense generally under the
first or second clause or both of these clauses of Article 134.
Furthermore, the fact that the specification does not designate the
particular federal statute upon which the prosecution is based does
not necessarily mean that the specification is insufficient to show a
violation of that federal statute.6 6 Thus, by refraining from de-
signating a particular federal statute, the Government may very
well be able to prosecute its case under any one or all of the
clauses of Article 134. On the other hand, by designating the par-
ticular federal statute violated, the Government may restrict it-
self unduly to the theory embodied in the third ("crimes and
offenses not capital") clause of the general article. This is so
because in such prosecutions the law officer need not instruct the
court-martial that the alleged misconduct is either prejudicial to
good order and discipline or of a nature to bring discredit upon the
armed forces or both. The absence of such instructions would
65 See generally United States v. Dicario, 8 USCMA 353, 24 CMR 163
(1957); United States v. Herndon, 1 USOMA 461, 4 OMR 53 (1952);
Ackroyd, The General Articles, Articles 133 and 134 of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, 35 St. John's L. Rev. 264 (1961).
66 Cf. United States v. Herndon, supra note 65.
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necessarily limit the Government to a theory of the case controlled
solely by the third clause of the general article. 67 Such practice,
while advantageous to the Government, is subject to the criticism
that it violates the spirit of modern notice pleading in that it
avoids giving the accused notice of the precise theory of the
Government's case. However, as long as the general article affords
the Government the opportunity to proceed with its case on more
than one theory, neither ethics nor law requires the prosecution
to limit itself by giving notice of its choice of theories.
Turning now to questions of proof in obscenity cases, the Gov-
ernment's burden is met in much the same way as it would be in
prosecutions in federal civil courts. For mail offenses, the proof
required is almost identical to prosecutions under Section 1461.0"
The Government must show that the accused (a) knowingly de-
posited in the mail (b) obscene matter.G9 In the case of private
letters the burden of showing a knowing deposit is met by proof,
including the expert testimony of handwriting or typewriter
analysts, that the accused wrote the letter in question. In cases
involving other than privately written material, the knowing de-
posit can only be established by circumstantial evidence. The
obscenity of the mailed matter is generally established by its bare
introduction; however, testimony by experts on literary porno-
graphy that the material is pornographic would also likely be
admissible. 70 This opinion testimony would not violate the so-
called "ultimate issue" doctrine since it represents only a literary
judgment as to the nature of the material and does not "usurp"
the court-martial's responsibility to determine the legal nature
of the material. But the literary judgment is relevant, since it is
a factor bearing on the question of whether the material has re-
deeming social value.
7 1
For other than mail offenses, the Government must introduce
the material alleged to be obscene and, to overcome the present
rule that bare possession of pornography does not violate the
Uniform Code,72 should show that the material was openly and
67 United States v. Dicario, supra note 65. See United States v. Holt, 12
USCMA 471, 31 CMR 57 (1961).
68 CM 400388, Schneider, supra note 59 (prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1462
(1958), failed because statute held not applicable to domestic transportation
of pornographic materials but only to importation of such materials from
abroad).
69 See note 22 supra.
70 Cf. note 79 infra and accompanying text.
71 See United States v. Smith 361, U.S. 147, 160 (1959) (concurring opinion
by Frankfurter, J) ; cf. Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry, 175 F.Supp. 488
(S.D N.Y. 1959), aff'd, 276 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1960).
72 See notes 59 and 60 supra and accompanying text.
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notoriously disseminated or communicaco. i most instances
proof of open and notorious communication will be readily avail-
able.
73
The defense can, of course, content itself with a general denial
and need not introduce any evidence. But the defense may wish
to aqsert either a lack of guilty knowledge on the part of the
accused or the non-obscenity of the material. On the question of
scienter, defense proof will usually be in the form of testimony
by the accused, should he be willing to take the stand, that he
was unaware of the contents of the material in issue. A more
complex question of proof is presented when the defense chooses
to defend on the ground that the material is not obscene, judged
by contemporary standards. The defense has two options. First,
it may wish to show that the conduct for which the accused is
being prosecuted is prevalent in the military and is tolerated by
the contemporary military community, assuming that the concept
of the contemporary community does have legal significance.
74
This would require testimony as to both the prevalence and general
acceptance of the alleged misconduct. While testimony by military
personnel on the prevailing moral climate in the military may well
be relevant, 75 admissibility of such evidence is questionable on two
grounds. First, there would seem to be no real need for this type
of testimony since the members of a court-martial would have as
much knowledge of the prevailing mores of the military com-
munity as would any witnesses whom the accused might be able
to secure.76 Second, and more basic, such testimony, particularly
73 In the case of CM 405791, Ford, supra note 56, however, the Govirnment
only became aware of the accused's conduct when New York police and postal
inspectors discovered certain of Ford's letters in the files of a New York
pornography peddler. Subsequent investigation by military police criminal
investigators turned up the fact that the accused had loaned the book Hele'n
and Desire to a civilian and had shown a pornographic picture to a fellow
officer.
74 Some support for such a defense might be gleaned from the case of CM
401092, Wheatley, 28 CMR 461, aff'd, 10 USCMA 539, 28 CMR 105 (1959).
In that case the accused, a company commander, was convicted of maltreat-
ment of subordinates in that he permitted members of his cadre to require
trainee$ to respond to the order to "sound off" by repeating certain "four-
letter" words a dozen times. An Army Board of review, while finding the
response obscene and crude, also found that the response "could not bo
considered unduly shocking to the sensibilities of those who heard it in the
milieu in which it was used." 28 CMR at 463 (emphasis added). The Army
board found some support in the testimony of one trainee who conpidered the
required response to be nothing more than U mild and somewhat humorous
form of hazing.
75 See note 79 infra.
76 It is highly unlihely that an accused in an obscenity prosecution could
secure the favorable testimony of the only recognized experts in the field of
military morals-military chaplains.
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in officer cases, appears to go to an ultimate issue in obscenity
prosecutions, i.e., whether the conduct engaged in is unbecoming
to an officer and gentleman or is prejudicial to good order and dis-
cipline. 77 Whatever the objection, one Army board of review has
already held such evidence to be inadmissible. 7"
The other option would be to show that the material has re-
deeming social value. This can be established either through the
positive testimony of literary experts that the material has literary
value or the negative testimony of experts on pornography such
as psychologists that the material is not pornographic. Again,
as with expert testimony for the Government, this evidence is
relevant and does not conflict with the "ultimate issue" limitation
on expert opinion testimony. Therefore, there should be no ques-
tion as to its admissibility. 9
V. CONCLUSION
In examining this article the reader must inevitably become
gware of the many unresolved questions in the field of criminal
obscenity law. Some of these questions may in time be answered
by federal, state and military tribunals. Many others, because of
the deeply conceptual nature of obscenity law, may never be sub-
ject to the type of final resolution favored by practicing counsel.
But the military lawyer interested in military justice and the pro-
tection of the legitimate interests of a civilized society such as
our own should not be discouraged by the often nebulous con-
sistency of the law. Rather, he should be encouraged to lend his
talents to making sharper and more precise the available tools of
legal analysis in this field, for though there may be no empirical
proof to establish that the unrestrained dissemination of porno-
graphy has a deleterious effect upon a society, common sense tells
77 A different situation would seem to exist where the conduct is alleged to
be service discrediting. If the activity charged is in relation to civilians,
whether or not the activity is prevalent and accepted in the military com-
munity would be only one factor in determining the ultimate issue of whether
or not it represents service discrediting conduct.
78 CM 405791, Ford, supra note 56.
7 Yudkin v. State, 182 A.2d 798 (Md. 1962) (unanimous opinion); see
Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry, supra note 71, in which District Judge
Bryan, in authorizing for mailing the book Lady Chatt'rley's Lover by D. H.
Lawrence, relied heavily upon the expert opinion of noted literary critics.
While the case came before the United States District Court on appeal from
an administrative decision of the Post Office Department, Judge Bryan held
that he had the duty to determine the question of obscenity de novo. See also




us that such traffic may lead to the perversion of normal healthy
sex attitudes of young people and may also result in overt sex
offenses. Society should be protected against this form of corrup-
tion. One way in which this can be accomplished is through the
continued enforcement of our criminal obscenity law, no matter
how difficult it may sometimes prove to be.
This is not to say, however, that the civilian and military police
and prosecutors should become latter day Anthony Comstocks.
Intelligence and discrimination are required if enforcement is to
have a salutary effect. A free society must protect itself against
harmful sexual deviation and yet not lose its precious freedom of
expression.
While the difficulties in creating precise legal doctrine and con-
cepts in this field are necessarily great, the military lawyer has a
responsibility to make the effort because a rational, workable,
but properly circumscribed, obscenity law is needed to protect
society.
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